Server, hosting and website monitoring, check by check

Four host types, each with its own checks: what we measure, how often, what alerts you and what stays on the host page. Plus what stays out of sight, said upfront.

Every check, by host type

VPS with agent

A server with root access, running the full agent. The report arrives signed, every 5 minutes by default (anywhere from 1 to 60, your choice). From outside we check the host address (on an IP: blocklists and ports; on a domain: the site, DNS, certificate) and every site hosted on the server.

from the report

  • CPU, as load per core (every 5 min) [on the host page]: Load normalized per core, not true utilization: that is what a shell script can compute cheaply. It can exceed 100% when a run queue forms. It shows in the host page charts; it sends no alert.
  • Memory and the / disk (every 5 min) [on the host page]: In the dashboard the number turns amber from 85% memory and 80% disk, so you get days to clean up. Full memory sends no alert on its own; processes killed for lack of memory and a disk at 97% do (the rows below).
  • Load average and uptime (every 5 min) [on the host page]: A reboot you did not know about shows up as uptime reset between two reports, even when nothing else changed.

what the agent watches

  • SSH logins, accepted and failed (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Source, user and method. Three things open an incident: a login with a key we do not know (critical), a successful login after at least 10 failures from the same address within two hours (critical), and a password login from a new address (warning). The usual wave of failures stays on the host page.
  • SSH keys, accounts and sudo (every 5 min) [alerts you]: A new key in authorized_keys, an SSH certificate authority, a new account with a shell, a new member of sudo, wheel or docker, a new sudoers line, or an account created or changed (useradd, usermod, passwd): a critical incident at once, with no threshold.
  • Suspicious processes, by behavior (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Not signatures but a score: a binary started from /tmp or deleted from disk after starting, an interpreter running a script from /tmp, CPU above 80% for at least 10 minutes, an unusual user. From a score of 7 it is a critical incident. That is how the miner posing as a system process was caught.
  • Connections to mining ports (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Established connections to the ports mining pools use (3333, 4444, 14444 and ten more), excluding private addresses and connections that came in on a port the server itself listens on. A critical incident. A miner moved to port 443 does not show here; the process rule catches it by its CPU use.
  • New executables in volatile directories (every 5 min) [alerts you]: /tmp, /var/tmp and /dev/shm: ELF files or scripts with the execute bit, new since the last report, with a sha256 fingerprint. A critical incident: that is where almost every payload lands first.
  • Backdoor patterns and fingerprints in the webroot (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Webshells, obfuscated eval, uploaders and risky lines in .htaccess or .user.ini, in the site roots named in the nginx and Apache configuration. Only new or changed files are read (their first and last 64 KB), and a certain pattern opens a critical incident. Every file has a fingerprint: a new, changed or deleted one shows on the host page, without an alert.
  • Web traffic of the hosted sites (every 5 min) [alerts you]: The server’s nginx and Apache logs, summarized per source: how many different paths it tries in an hour, how many errors it gets, whether it announces a scanning tool, requests shaped like a backdoor. A sustained campaign opens an incident; an ordinary bot stays a note on the host page.
  • The server’s mail, where there is one (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Only where postfix, exim or dovecot runs. An account sending more than 1,000 messages an hour or a queue above 2,000 messages opens a critical incident; repeated password attempts and smaller volumes stay on the host page. Usernames typed in failed logins never leave the server.
  • Firewall blocks and fail2ban (every 5 min) [on the host page]: We count from the rule counters, not from the log: firewalld ships with logging off, so on most RHEL servers the log is empty while the counters climb. The log only says who was blocked.
  • Firewall rules, as a baseline (every 5 min) [on the host page]: We read the rules straight from nftables, firewalld, ufw or iptables and diff them against the previous ones. A deleted rule is the half that matters: that is how a door opens. If we find no firewall with rules at all, we say so: a server without one produces no blocks.
  • New listening ports (every 5 min) [on the host page]: A diff against the approved state, by address and port. A port that appears without you installing anything is the question of the day. The ports actually exposed to the internet are checked from outside by the IP probe (below).
  • Cron jobs and systemd timers (every 5 min) [on the host page]: /etc/crontab, cron.d, user crontabs and systemd timers, with the whole command. Persistence is set up through cron more often than through anything else.

system health

  • Disk and inodes, on every filesystem (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Not only /: a full /var stops the database and the logs while / still looks fine. A warning on the host page from 90%, a critical incident from 97%.
  • Failed systemd units (every 5 min) [on the host page]: Every service systemd has marked as failed, by name. A certbot that died at three in the morning shows up here before the certificate expires.
  • Processes killed by the kernel for lack of memory (every 5 min) [on the host page]: What the OOM killer stopped since the last report. A database killed overnight leaves only this trace.
  • Pending updates and required reboot (every 6 h) [on the host page]: How many updates are available and how many are security fixes, simulated from the package lists already on the server: the agent installs nothing. Security updates and a reboot pending for over 7 days become a warning.
  • SSH password logins (every 6 h) [on the host page]: From the effective sshd configuration, not the file. Root with a password is a warning; passwords for other accounts are noted.
  • System posture, in a single check (every 5 min) [on the host page]: Security updates, a pending reboot, root with a password, a missing or non-filtering firewall: gathered into one check that shows on the host page and in the security score. It is hygiene, so it sends no alert.
  • The server’s PHP, against PHP2Shell (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Every installed PHP version and the package it comes from: whether the one your sites use is affected by PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619), whether your distribution shipped the fix under the old number, and whether PHP was restarted after the update. The inventory is refreshed every 6 hours; an affected version in use opens an incident.
  • Operating system out of support (every 5 min) [on the host page]: A release out of support no longer receives security updates, however often you upgrade. We warn 90 days ahead.

from outside, if the address is an IP

  • Blocklists for the IP (every 6 h) [alerts you]: The server’s address, on Spamhaus ZEN, SpamCop and Barracuda. A listed IP is a critical incident: the server’s mail stops arriving. A list that does not answer means “unknown”, not “clean”.
  • Ports exposed to the internet (every 12 h) [alerts you]: We try 16 ports from outside, on the server’s IP. A database (MySQL, PostgreSQL, Redis, MongoDB, Elasticsearch, Memcached), the Docker API, VNC or Telnet reachable from the internet is a critical incident; RDP, FTP and Kibana are a warning.

from outside, if the address is a domain

  • HTTP availability (every 1 min) [alerts you]: The site at the host address, seen as a visitor sees it: code, response time, redirects. A failure is confirmed by a second probe 15 seconds later, before alerting.
  • DNS records (every hour) [alerts you]: A, NS and MX against the baseline, from public resolvers. A change of A or NS is a critical incident.
  • TLS certificate and blocklists (every 6 h) [alerts you]: The certificate actually served (chain, name, days left: 21 and 7) and whether the domain’s IP is on the lists that affect mail.
  • Domain registration expiry (every 12 h) [alerts you]: Through RDAP, with whois as a fallback. Warning at 30 days, critical at 7. For .ro the registry publishes no date, so we watch the domain status.

the sites hosted on the server

  • The hosted sites, each with its own probe (every 1 min) [alerts you]: The domains in the nginx and Apache configuration that the agent reports are tried once; the ones that answer get an HTTP probe, without using a host from your plan. A failure is confirmed by a second probe 15 seconds later, before alerting.
  • The certificates of every hosted site (every 10 min) [alerts you]: The certificate each probed site serves: a warning 21 days before expiry or when browsers reject it, critical from 7 days. One incident per server, listing the sites.

remediation, only with your approval

  • Block an address in the firewall (on request) [with your approval]: IPv4 only, on nftables, firewalld or ufw. The rule expires after 24 hours: on nftables inside the kernel itself, on firewalld and ufw at the agent’s next run, so even if the dashboard stops answering. The agent refuses private addresses, the server’s own address, the gateway, the DNS resolvers and the dashboard’s addresses: blocking any of them would sever the very channel that could undo it.
  • Stop a process (on request) [with your approval]: Before sending the signal the agent re-checks that the pid still belongs to the same program: name, executable and the start time recorded by the kernel. A pid recycled between proposal and approval is refused, not killed. systemd, sshd, journald and the rest of what keeps the server administrable are never touched.
  • Move a file to quarantine (on request) [with your approval]: It is moved, never deleted or rewritten: the file stays as evidence and goes back with one click. Only from /tmp, /var/tmp and /dev/shm, never through a symlink, and only if the fingerprint still matches the one at the moment of the decision.
  • Restart the web server (on request) [with your approval]: nginx, Apache, LiteSpeed or PHP-FPM, only the units the agent reports. The configuration is tested first (nginx -t, apachectl -t, php-fpm -t): if the test fails, nothing is restarted and you see why. Then a reload or restart, a check that the service is still running two seconds later, the last lines of its log and a fresh probe of the site from outside. At most three restarts an hour for the same service. It can be turned off on the server with VPSDASH_ACTIONS_SERVICES=0.

from our side

  • Silent agent: a critical incident (always on) [alerts you]: If three reports in a row do not arrive, we treat the absence as a signal, not as quiet. Either the server is off or the agent was stopped, and the second is what a successful compromise looks like.
  • A collector that can no longer read (every 5 min) [alerts you]: A moved log, a lost permission, a missing tool: the affected collector is named, with the reason. A silent collector must never look like a clean server.
  • A wrongly signed command: a critical incident (always on) [alerts you]: Every command is signed with your server’s secret, over a random number the agent generated seconds earlier, so a recorded reply cannot be replayed later. If the signature does not verify, the agent refuses and reports it: someone is trying to command the server.

What it cannot see: Security headers, page content, email posture and the site’s exposed files are not checked from outside on a VPS: for those, add the same domain as an external site too. And nothing inside the applications: the agent sees the server, not the database or the application code.

Shared hosting

A hosting account (usually cPanel), without root. The agent runs inside the account, as its own user, while the site is checked from outside in parallel. Two angles, because neither one is enough alone.

from inside the account

  • sha256 fingerprints of the webroot files (every 5 min) [on the host page]: We compare fingerprint against fingerprint, not the modified date, which can be forged. Only files whose size, inode or change time (ctime) differ are re-read: the owner of a file cannot set that one back. On a site nobody touched, a run reads no files at all. Up to 40,000 files per account, inventoried in instalments of at most 2,000 per run; past that cap the dashboard says plainly that the inventory is truncated. Besides PHP, HTML and JS, it watches .htaccess, .user.ini, php.ini, the rarer extensions (.php3 to .php8, .phps, .pht, .phar, .shtml) and double extensions (x.php.jpg). A new, changed or deleted file shows on the host page, without an alert.
  • Injection patterns inside the files (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Webshells, obfuscated eval, uploaders, PHP under uploads and risky lines in .htaccess or .user.ini, searched in the first and last 64 KB of the files that are being re-read anyway, so the cost is near zero. A certain pattern opens a critical incident. The file never leaves the server: you get the matched fragment (at most 40 characters) and the line number.
  • The account access logs (every 5 min) [alerts you]: The account access logs (domlogs), summarized per source: how many different paths it tries, how many errors it gets, scanning tools and POST requests to the root. A sustained campaign opens an incident.
  • The account crontab (every 5 min) [on the host page]: Any job added or removed, with the whole command. It is one of the forms of persistence within reach of an account without root; the others (.htaccess, prepend files, scripts left in the site) are covered by the file inventory.
  • Your sites’ PHP, against PHP2Shell (every 5 min) [alerts you]: The PHP version the account’s sites run (MultiPHP, PHP Selector) and its package: whether it is affected by PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) or the provider already shipped the fix. The inventory is refreshed every 6 hours; an affected version in use opens an incident.
  • One-click cleanup, with your approval (on request) [with your approval]: You tick the infected files and quarantine them in one click, which proposes the batch rather than running it: every move is approved in the dashboard, with all paths visible. Files move outside the webroot, so they are no longer reachable from the web, but they stay as evidence and go back with one click too. We never rewrite a file’s contents. wp-config.php, .htaccess, configuration.php and settings.php are refused: if one of them is infected, the fix is to edit it, not remove it, otherwise an infection becomes a total outage.

from outside

  • HTTP availability (every 1 min) [alerts you]: Code, response time and redirects, from a server unrelated to yours. An apex pointing at another domain stays a warning, not green. A failure is confirmed by a second probe 15 seconds later, before alerting.
  • DNS records and delegation (every hour) [alerts you]: A, NS and MX against the baseline. We query public resolvers, not the server’s own, so a local outage cannot read as a vanished domain. A change of A or NS is a critical incident.
  • TLS certificate (every 6 h) [alerts you]: Issuer, chain and days left. Warning at 21 days, critical at 7, so the renewal does not land on a weekend. A change of certificate authority is reported separately.
  • Blocklists (every 6 h) [alerts you]: Spamhaus ZEN, SpamCop and Barracuda: three lists that genuinely affect mail delivery. A listed IP is a critical incident; a list that does not answer means “unknown”, not “clean”.
  • Third-party scripts, cookies and defacement (every 6 h) [alerts you]: What loads from outside, which cookies are written without protection and how the page structure changes. A new script shows on the host page; signs of defacement (a “hacked by” message, spam words in the title, obfuscated JavaScript) open a critical incident.
  • Exposed sensitive files (every 12 h) [alerts you]: .git, .env, backups, dumps and phpinfo. A control probe with a random name first establishes what “not found” looks like, so a site that redirects everything does not read as full of exposed files.
  • Domain registration expiry (every 12 h) [alerts you]: Through RDAP, with whois as a fallback. Warning at 30 days, critical at 7. For .ro the registry publishes no date, so we watch the domain status: on hold or expired is critical.
  • Security headers (every 6 h) [on the host page]: HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP and Referrer-Policy, measured on the final page, not on the redirect. What is missing shows on the host page and in the score, without an alert.
  • SPF, DMARC, DKIM, CAA, DNSSEC (every 12 h) [on the host page]: Syntax, duplicates and over-permissive policies, including two SPF records where the standard allows exactly one. It shows on the host page, without an alert; the exceptions are DNSSEC switched off on a zone that was signed and a new issuer added to CAA, which open an incident.
  • TLS quality: protocols and ciphers (every 12 h) [on the host page]: Outdated versions still accepted, weak ciphers and RSA keys under 2048 bits, tested with a real handshake rather than inferred from a banner. It shows on the host page, without an alert.

from our side

  • Silent agent: a critical incident (always on) [alerts you]: If three reports in a row do not arrive, either the account was suspended or the agent was removed from cron. Both are worth knowing.
  • A collector that can no longer read (every 5 min) [alerts you]: A moved webroot or an access log that can no longer be read: the affected collector is named, with the reason, not treated as quiet.

What it cannot see: Processes, ports, SSH logins, CPU and memory. They belong to the server, not to the account, and reporting them as yours would be disinformation, not data. No port scan either: every account leaves through the same server.

External site

Nothing gets installed. You add the domain and the site is checked from outside the network, like any visitor would, from a server unrelated to yours. It is the only host type included in the Free plan too.

availability

  • HTTP code and response time (every 1 min) [alerts you]: Thresholds on response time, not just on the code: a site that answers in five seconds is down for the visitor, even when it returns 200. A failure is confirmed by a second probe 15 seconds later, before alerting. Optionally, the page must contain a text you choose: that also catches a suspended-account page or a defaced site, which still answer 200.
  • DNS records, alerting on change (every 15 min) [alerts you]: A change of A or NS is a critical incident and points you at the registrar: that is what a domain hijack looks like before anyone notices. An MX-only change is a warning.

certificate and content

  • TLS certificate, days left (every hour) [alerts you]: Issuer, full chain and name match, wildcards included. Warning at 21 days, critical at 7. A change of certificate authority is reported separately.
  • Third-party scripts, cookies and defacement (every hour) [alerts you]: External origins the page loads, unprotected cookies and structural changes against the last read show on the host page; signs of defacement open a critical incident.
  • Security headers (every hour) [on the host page]: What is missing and what is set too permissively (HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, Referrer-Policy). It shows on the host page and in the score, with the exact list; it sends no alert.

posture

  • Blocklists for your addresses (every 6 h) [alerts you]: Spamhaus ZEN, SpamCop and Barracuda, for up to four addresses of the domain. A listed IP is a critical incident.
  • Exposed sensitive files: .git, .env, backups (every 12 h) [alerts you]: Paths checked directly, as from the internet, with a control against sites that return the home page for any missing path.
  • Ports exposed to the internet (every 12 h) [alerts you]: We try 16 ports on the domain’s address. A database reachable from the internet is a critical incident; CDN ranges are skipped, because they are not yours.
  • Domain registration expiry (every 12 h) [alerts you]: Through RDAP, with whois as a fallback. Warning at 30 days, critical at 7. For .ro the registry publishes no date, so we watch the domain status: on hold or expired is critical. A changed registrar is a critical incident too.
  • SPF, DMARC, DKIM, CAA, DNSSEC (every 6 h) [on the host page]: Syntax, duplicates and over-permissive policies. Without DMARC, anyone can send mail in your domain’s name. It shows on the host page, without an alert; DNSSEC switched off on a signed zone and a new CAA issuer open an incident.
  • TLS quality: protocols, ciphers, keys (every 12 h) [on the host page]: A real handshake per protocol version. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 still accepted are a warning on the host page, not a footnote.

What it cannot see: Nothing from the inside: no processes, no files, no logs. In exchange it is the only angle that sees exactly what your customer sees.

cPanel/WHM reseller

Not a server, an index. We query WHM with the token you save in the dashboard and add one host per account we find, including the ones that appeared without you knowing. Every account whose domain is delegated gets the outside checks of a shared hosting host.

the server

  • cPanel version and load average (every 10 min) [alerts you]: A changed version and sustained load (warning from 15, critical from 30), as a signal of noisy neighbors on the server you resell. A WHM that does not answer is a critical incident.
  • API tokens and the 2FA policy (every 6 h) [on the host page]: A new API token is the key with which someone can do from outside everything you do from WHM: the check turns critical on the host page and in the score. 2FA not being mandatory is noted. It sends no alert.
  • Web traffic of the accounts without an agent (every 5 min) [alerts you]: Through WHM we read a sample of the recent visitors of the accounts that have no agent yet, up to 20 accounts per run. They feed the same web attack detector as the agent logs, so a sustained campaign opens an incident here too.

the accounts

  • Accounts added, removed or suspended (every 30 min) [alerts you]: A diff against the previous inventory. An account added or removed opens an incident; one suspended or reactivated is noted. A deleted or suspended account pauses its site probes, and they start again when it is reactivated.
  • Disk quotas, per account (every 30 min) [alerts you]: A warning on the host page from 90%, a critical incident from 98%. Quotas come from WHM as suffixed text, “698M” or “1.2G”; we convert them explicitly, because naive parsing reports a full account at 0.13% usage.
  • Shell, plan, IP and mail hold (every 30 min) [alerts you]: A shell granted to an account and mail held by cPanel are a critical incident: cPanel sets the hold flag itself when an account exceeds its mail rate, so it is the verdict of the server that sees the send queue. A changed IP or plan is a warning.
  • The agent on new accounts (every 30 min): You can install the agent on every unenrolled account with one command, or let new accounts enroll themselves as they appear, within your plan’s host limit. Installing through WHM needs cPanel API rights on the token, not just account listing. Accounts already reporting are skipped rather than reinstalled.

the domains

  • Expired domain or withdrawn delegation (every hour) [on the host page]: The account stays on the server, with files and mail, but the domain no longer resolves anywhere. From WHM it is invisible: the listing shows it as healthy as any other. It shows on the host page; the account gets no probes while the domain is not delegated.
  • Domain answering from elsewhere, or re-registered (every hour) [alerts you]: The delegation moved, but the account is still yours: a warning incident, and you can mark the account “not mine anymore”. A domain registered again by someone else after the account was created is a critical incident.

What it cannot see: What happens inside the accounts: files, cron, complete logs. For that you install the agent in the account itself, and the account becomes a shared hosting host. Discovered accounts do not use hosts from your plan; an account with probes or an agent uses one.